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INTRODUCTION

The European Community is rapidly developing comprehensive strict liability rules for uniform application within the
EC. This development advantages U.S. manufacturers that export to the EC because they no longer need to comply with the
various products liability laws within each EC member state. A
disadvantage, however, is that while the new EC liability laws
resemble U.S. law, they also depart from U.S. law in many
respects.
This Article explains EC products liability law by first
presenting the principles underlying U.S. products liability law
and then using them to illustrate EC products liability law.
The Article begins in Part II by comparing U.S. and EC strict
liability laws generally and then, in Parts III and IV, compares
the more specific design and manufacturing defect and failure
to warn theories. Part V introduces and discusses the EC's
proposed strict services liability laws. Part VI discusses the liability of product endorsers and how, if strict services liability
laws are adopted, manufacturers may have third-party claims
against them.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/3
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COMPARISON BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY STRICT LIABILITY LAWS

A.

Restatement Section 402A and the Strict Liability Directive
Compared
1.

General Principles of Strict Liability

In the United States, the principle of strict liability, which
developed in the 1960s, is codified in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Most states have expressly adopted
this principle.2 The general rule of section 402A is that one
who sells a product in a defective condition, thus making it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his property
is liable to the user or consumer for injuries or property damage that are caused by the product, 3 and the seller must be in
the business of selling the product that causes injury.4 The
product must reach the user in substantially the same condition in which it is sold. 5 The seller is liable under this principle
even where it has exercised all possible care. 6 Whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" depends upon whether the
product has adequate warnings or instructions, 7 and whether it
is reasonably designed.8
In the European Community, a similar principle of strict lia1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have not adopted the principle of strict tort liability for products.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 694 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
3. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l).
4. Id. § 402A(l)(a).
5. Id. § 402A(l)(b). In many instances, only circumstantial evidence is available
on this point. Such circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to warrant application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to create an inference that the product was, or was not,
in substantially the same condition when sold. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 332-33, 188 N.W.2d 426, 434 (1971) (holding that circumstantial evidence may be used to demonstrate a product's defectiveness and the
plaintiff need not prove specific claims of negligence).
6. Id. § 402A(2)(a). The seller of a defective product also will be liable to a user
or consumer even if the user or consumer did not purchase or enter into a contract
with the seller for the product. Id. § 402A(2)(b).
7. See, e.g.,
Parke-Davis and Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1399-1401 (8th
Cir. 1969) (finding that the manufacturer of a drug is obligated to give a valid and
effective warning explaining known dangers).
8. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. Section 402A employs the customer-contemplation test under which a product is defectively dangerous if it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
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bility is found in Council Directive 85/374 of July 25, 1985 on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, otherwise known as the Strict Liability Directive. 9 Article 1 of this directive provides, "The producer
shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product."'
This general statement of liability is similar to that found in
section 402A. Both rules provide that sellers are liable for injuries caused by defects in products, irrespective of "fault" or
other concepts of negligence. How closely these principles
parallel each other in the United States and European Community depends upon how similarly the key terms under the respective statements are defined.
2.

Key Terms Affecting Liability

Three basic terms must be defined to understand the application of the principle of strict liability in U.S. law. These are
"seller,"' ' "product,"' 2 and "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous."' 34 Under the EC
directives, the relevant terms are
"producer," 1 "product,"' 5 and "defect."16
as to the product's characteristics." See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99,
at 698.
9. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Strict Liability
Directive].
10. Id.
11. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. f (applying § 402A to "any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption").
12. Id. § 402A cmt. d (the term product includes "any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate
user or consumer").
13. Id. § 402A cmt. i (an unreasonably dangerous article "must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics").
14. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3. The directive defines "producer" as "the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material
or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by putting his name,
trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its producer." Id.
15. Id. art. 2. The directive defines product as "all movables, with the exception
of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another
movable or into an immovable." Id.
16. Id. art. 6. A product is defective when it "does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including ... the
presentation of the product; the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be put; [and] the time when the product was put into circulation." Id.
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a.

Seller Versus Producer

It is clear under section 402A that strict liability applies only
to persons engaged in the business of selling products for use
or consumption-manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and
distributors.' 7 It encompasses all entities in the production
process from the supplier of raw materials, to the builder of
component parts to the manufacturer of the finished product,18 and extends still further to the wholesalers, retailers, and
distributors of the product.' 9 It does not, however, apply to
the occasional or casual seller.20
The Strict Liability Directive uses the term "producer" instead of seller and defines it in article 3 as follows: "Producer"
means the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of
any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and
any person who, by putting his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its
producer. 2 '
This definition is quite similar to the definition of "seller" in
the United States in that it encompasses all persons in the
chain of manufacture, from the raw material supplier to the
retailer.2 2 Though no reference is made to the casual seller,
article 7 of the directive provides a defense to a producer if a
product was not manufactured by the producer for sale or for
any form of distribution with an economic purpose.2 3 This indicates that a producer, like a seller, must be in the business of
manufacturing the product in order to be found liable.
However, the directive's definition of "producer," like the
U.S. definition, includes more than just manufacturers, retail17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Leahy v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 507 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986), appeal denied, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1024 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the liability of the maker of a component part is dependent upon the existence of a defect in
the component part); see also Western Surety & Casualty Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433
N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. f. The rule set out in § 402A
"applies to any manufacturer of... a product, [or] to any wholesale or retail dealer
or distributor.... It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business
of selling such products." Id.
20. Id. § 402A cmt. f. "[T]he rule does not . .. apply to the occasional seller of
food or other such products who is not engaged in that activity as part of his business." Id.
21. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
22.

See supra notes 11 and 17-20 and accompanying text.

23. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(c).
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ers, and distributors. Sections 2 and 3 of article 3 of the Directive establish potential liability for persons who import
products into the European Community for sale, hire, or
lease. 2" A supplier of a product may also be treated as a producer unless it informs the injured person of the identity of the
producer or of the person who supplied the product.2 5 The
scope of this definition is therefore roughly equivalent to that
of "seller" in the United States.
b.

Product Definition

"Product" under U.S. strict liability laws includes any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition,
in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer. 26 It does not include services. The definition has
evolved to include food intended for human consumption,27
automobiles,2 8 airplanes, 29 power presses, 3o insecticides,3 and
32

products intended for intimate bodily use, such as cosmetics.
Electricity is a product in most states, but supplying electricity
is a service.5
"Products" defined in article 2 of the directive are "all movables, with the exception of primary agricultural products and
game, even though incorporated into another movable or into
an immovable.

3' 4

Primary agricultural products may be in-

cluded if a given member state so chooses.3 5
The definition of a "movable," however, is not clear under
24. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(2), 3(3).
25. Id.

26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. d.
27. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913) (discussing liability of a food manufacturer for a product which included "a foul, filthy, nauseating
and poisonous substance").
28. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(holding that disclaimer of liability did not protect manufacturer).
29. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 643 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981).
30. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982).
31. See, e.g., Skogen v. Dow Chem. Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967).
32. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958)
(finding liability for a defective "home permanent" for hair, which caused injury).
33. See, e.g., Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.
1988) (holding that electricity is a product); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1985) (holding that electricity becomes a product only upon
passing through customer's meter).
34. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 2.
35. Id. Each member state may "by way of derogation from Article 2, provide in
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the directive. If it is read to mean goods, as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the term could be read
more narrowly than "product" under section 402A. Section 2105(1) of the UCC defines "goods" as "all things.., which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." 3 6
Many items considered "products" for strict liability purposes
are not necessarily "goods" under the UCC. 7 This interpretation is more narrow than the U.S. definition of product. If, on
the other hand, the definition is not so restricted, and is taken
literally to mean anything movable, the term may be as broad
as the definition under section 402A. However, even fixtures-items actually attached to real property that are not
"movable"-can be "products" under U.S. strict liability
laws. 8
c.

"Defect" Versus "Defective Condition Unreasonably
Dangerous"

The phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
is the most important in strict liability law. It is defined in various ways in various states. 39 The section 402A definition provides that the product must be more dangerous than would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer purchasing it with the
knowledge common to the community. There are generally
4
three different types of defects: design, 40 manufacturing, '
its legislation that within the meaning of Article 1 of this directive 'product' also
means primary agricultural products and game." Id.
36. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1977).
37. Section 402A includes "any product [sold] in a defective condition ...if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) [the product] is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
inthe condition in which it is sold." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l).
38. See, e.g., Begay v. Livingston, 658 P.2d 434 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (heating
unit in motel room); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 386 N.E.2d 1126 (Il.
App. Ct. 1978) (dumbwaiter); DeCrosta v. A. Reynolds Constr. & Supply Corp., 375
N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 364 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1977) (in-ground
swimming pool).
39. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1972); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 402A cmt. g.
40. See, e.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981)
(holding that strict liability principles apply to the design of ajeep rollbar, which did
not withstand back-to-front flip over); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545
S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Ct. App.) (finding manufacturer liable for the loss of an eye resulting from defective automobile window glass which shattered into small particles),
rev'd on other grounds, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
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and inadequate warnings and instructions.42 Generally, a
plaintiff must prove that the product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous.43
Many courts have found the Restatement's test to be unworkable. 44 It is commonly referred to as the "consumer expectation test" because it focuses on the expectations of the
ordinary consumer who purchases the product. 45 The test is

generally easy to state but difficult to apply. How does it apply,
for example, to obvious defects known to the consumer? How
is the "ordinary consumer" defined? 46 Because of such
problems, courts have developed other definitions.
The leading alternative definition is called the risk utility
test.4 7 In essence, the test calls for weighing the utility of the
product against the risks inherent in its use. 48 Factors consid-

ered include the usefulness and desirability of the product, 49
41. See, e.g., Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1978).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmts, h, j; see also Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725
P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986). Notwithstanding the "strict liability" label, failure to warn
cases are better characterized as decisions based on negligence principles. Many
courts, for example, have held that there is no duty to warn of dangers which are
generally known or recognized. See, e.g., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d
565 (Iowa 1986) (no duty to warn of danger associated with excessive consumption
of alcohol).
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. "[T]he rule stated in this Section
applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Id.
44. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978) (expressly rejecting
the Restatement approach, which would have required that the plaintiff show the
product was unreasonably dangerous).
45.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 1, § 402A cmt. j. "Where ... the product [or its]

ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it ....
."Id.
46. For example, some courts have replaced the "ordinary consumer" with a
"foreseeable user" for the purpose of extending the law's protection to non-purchasers. Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725 (N.H. 1976) (holding that a child who
lacks the ability to appreciate a dangerous product is still protected under strict liability laws). See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99, at 698 & n.24 (stating that
what would be contemplated by purchaser or consumer may not be contemplated by
a foreseeable user).
47. See, e.g.,
Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 512 A.2d 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986) (hammer's utility outweighed risk of chipping).
48. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99, at 699. "Under this test, a product
can be said to be defective in the kind of way that makes it 'unreasonably dangerous'
if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable
or not, outweighs the utility of the product." Id.
49. Id. The test looks to design and marketing, availability of alternative products, and alternative designs.
...
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the likelihood and seriousness of injury,5" the availability of an
alternative product, 5 the ability of the manufacturer to eliminate the unsafe characteristic of the product,5 2 the user's ability to avoid the danger,5" the user's awareness of the danger,5 4
and the manufacturer's ability to spread losses through pricing
and insurance." 5 This test is most commonly used in design
defect cases where the ordinary consumer would not form an
expectation with regard to a relevant safety feature.5 6
The concept of "defect" is defined in article 6 of the directive as follows:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected
that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole
reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation.5 7
While this definition seems to be more closely aligned to the
consumer expectation test than to the risk-utility test, it contains elements of both tests. On the one hand, the basic standard is "the safety which a person is entitled to expect, "58
which is quite similar to the component of the consumer ex50. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982) (holding that the likelihood of injury is a relevant factor in determining whether a defect
exists).
51. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1980) (alternative design available to make police car more crashworthy); Reeves v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 439 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allegation that alternative design
incorporating safety guard was available for power press is admissible to demonstrate
defectiveness).
52. See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Colo.
1986) (where plaintiff alleged that the oral contraceptive drug was defectively
designed, the court gave jury instructions on unavoidable danger); see also John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
53. Wade, supra note 52, at 837-38.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. David A. Urban, Custom's Proper Role in Strict Product Liability Actions Based on
Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439, 456-58 (1990) (discussing risk-benefit and consumer expectations for defects in design of products).
57. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
58. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, pmbl.
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pectation test in section 402A, which provides that the product
"must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
59
contemplated by the ordinary consumer.
However, under the directive, the definition of a defective
condition also includes factors such as the use of the product
and the presentation of the product. 60 These factors more
closely resemble the risk-utility balancing test because they require the court to consider the utility of the product and
whether the risks were communicated to the buyer. However
characterized, plaintiffs generally will find it easier to prove a
defect under this definition than under section 402A of the Restatement because it is not necessary to prove that the product is
both defective and unreasonably dangerous.
"Presentation of the product" undoubtedly includes warnings and instructions, as in section 402A of the Restatement.
This means that, like section 402A, the Strict Liability Directive
may impose liability where the warnings and instructions on a
product are found to be inadequate. 6' This phrase may also
create liability for how the product is displayed or advertised.
This would be similar to U.S. law dealing with misrepresentations and the dilution of warnings or instructions.6 2
Though section 2 of article 6 of the directive makes clear
that a product is to be judged at the time it was manufactured,
and not judged on the basis of subsequently developed products, 63 a producer may not be able to rely on the state of the art
defense under the directive. Article 15, section 1 (b), allows
European Community member states to decide individually
59. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. To illustrate, comment i suggests: "Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make
some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous." Id.
60. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
61. See Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7. A defense for a component
manufacturer is that the defect is attributable "to the design of the product in which
the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the
product." Id.
62. See, e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1992); Mozeke v.
International Paper Co., 933 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1991).
63. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(2). A "product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation." See also id. art. 7(e). "The state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time when [the producer] put the product into circulation was not such as to
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered .
I..."
Id.
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whether state of the art will be a defense under the directive.'
In the United States, the state of the art at the time the product
was manufactured is a factor to be considered by the jury in
deciding whether the product is defective.65
3.

Defenses to a Strict Liability Claim

There are a number of defenses to a strict liability claim in
the United States. For example, a manufacturer may show that
the plaintiff has failed to prove the basic elements of a strict
liability claim required by section 402A,6 6 or that the product
has been substantially altered since it left the manufacturer's
possession.67 A manufacturer also may show that the product
is not defective by showing compliance with the state of the
art 68 or with government standards.6 9 This evidence will be

considered by the jury, but will not be conclusive in proving a
defect. A manufacturer may also rely on a statute of limitations 70 or a statute of repose 71 to avoid old claims. Of course,
64. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 15. Article 15(b) provides in relevant part,
By way of derogation from Article 7(e), [each Member State may] maintain
or, subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 2 of this article, provide in
this legislation that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be
discovered.
Id.
65. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305-06 (N.J. 1983) (holding
that, notwithstanding the absence of a safer alternative design at the time the product, a swimming pool, was marketed, the jury was entitled to consider whether the
risk of injury so outweighed the swimming pool's utility that liability should be
imposed).
66. See supra Part II.A.3. for a discussion of defenses to a § 402A claim.
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l)(b). The seller of product is subject to
liability where the product is sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,
and "it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
changes in the condition in which it was sold." Id.
68. See, e.g., Clarksville-Montgomery County Sch. Syst. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 925 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that state of the art evidence is admissible
and represents "the amount or extent of scientific and technological knowledge available to the manufacturer or seller [of the product] at the time the product was placed
on the market"). Id. at 1005.
69. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (compliance with government standard is persuasive, but not necessarily conclusive, evidence against a finding of defective design).
70. See, e.g., Digioia v. H. Koch & Sons, 944 F.2d 809 (11 th Cir. 1991); Kullman v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 943 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988) (holding
that liability was barred by 10-year statute of repose governing claims for personal
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the manufacturer may also argue that a plaintiff's own conduct
or misuse of the product caused the accident,72 or that there
were other causes of the accident in addition to, or to the exclusion of, its product.7"
The Strict Liability Directive contains a number of similar
defenses scattered throughout articles 7, 8, 10, 11, and 17. For
example, under article 7(b), a producer will not be liable if it
can prove that the defect did not exist at the time the product
was put into circulation.7 1 If the defect resulted from an alteration, this proof is similar to a substantial alteration defense.7 5
However, it is not clear how this defense relates to a producer's potential post-sale obligations under the Proposed
76
Product Safety Directive discussed below.
The producer also will escape liability if it can prove that it
did not put the product into circulation,77 or that the product
was not manufactured in the course of business or for an economic purpose.78 This is similar to a defense under section
402A that the seller is only an occasional seller and is not in
the business of selling the product.79
The producer also is not liable if it can prove that the defect
in the product is due to compliance with mandatory regulations issued by public authorities.80 Professor Taschner and
others have indicated that this provision will be strictly construed and very narrowly applied. 8 ' The only possible couninjury caused by new manufacturing equipment). A statute of repose limits the liability of a manufacturer or seller of a product by setting a fixed time after the sale or
first use of an item beyond which the manufacturer or seller of that item will not be
held liable. Id. at 640.
72. See, e.g., Wilson v. B3icycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1990);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
73. See, e.g., Watson v. Lucerne Mach. and Equip. Inc., 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (finding no liability for manufacturer where death was caused by reckless disregard of supervisor's warnings to stay away from a citrus processor which
presented obvious dangers during operation).
74. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(b).
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1)(b).
76. See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the Proposed Product Safety Directive.
77. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(a).
78. Id. art. 7(c).
79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1)(a) cmt. f. Seller "applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption . .. [but]
does not.., apply to the occasional seller of food or other such products who is not
engaged in that activity as a part of his business." Id.
80. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(d).
81. Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules,
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terpart in U.S. law is the military contractor defense under
which manufacturers are not liable where their products are
found to be defective as a result of complying with specifications provided by the military. 2 In the United States, compliance with voluntary standards like those promulgated by the
American National Standards Institute, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, and other groups and agencies is not an absolute defense, but only a factor to be considered by the jury in deciding whether the product is defective.
Unlike U.S. law, where compliance with state of the art is
merely a factor for the jury to consider in deciding whether a
product is defective, member states that allow the state of the
art defense consider compliance to be an absolute defense
3
under the European Community's Strict Liability Directive.
In fact, all of the defenses listed under article 7 are absolute
defenses. The first sentence of article 7 provides that "the
producer shall not be liable ...if he proves," and then lists six
separate circumstances in which the producer will not be held
liable for damage or injury caused by a defective product.8 4
371 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 81 (1989) (noting that article 7 of the Strict Liability

Directive has been worded to give courts a duty of careful review); see also Hans C.
Taschner, La Future Responsabiliti du Fait des Produits Defectueux dans la Communauti
Europiene, REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN 257 (1986).

82. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); George E.
Hurley, Jr., Government Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases: The Need for
Judicial Intervention, 117 MIL. L. REV. 219 (1987).
83. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7 (defenses available to
producers).
84. Id. Article 7 provides:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this directive if he proves:
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the
product was put into circulation by him or that this defect came into
being afterward; or
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any
form of distribution for economic purposes nor manufactured or
distributed by him in the course of his business; or
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory
regulations issued by the public authorities; or
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when
he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the
existence of the defect to be discovered; or
() in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect is attributable to the design of the product in which the component has
been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the
product.
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Under article 8 of the Strict Liability Directive, the liability of
a producer may be reduced or disallowed when damage is
caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the
injured person or any person for whom the injured person is
responsible.8 5 This is similar to U.S. notions of assumption of
the risk 6 and comparative fault. However, the Strict Liability
Directive does not specify how the reduction of liability is to be
applied or calculated. It is unclear whether a plaintiff who is
fifty-one percent responsible for his injuries will be allowed to
receive forty-nine percent of the verdict, or be totally barred
from a recovery.
Article 10 of the Strict Liability Directive provides a statute
of limitations.88 However, the limitations period depends in
part on existing laws on limitations periods within member
states. Strict liability statutes of limitations in the United
States vary from two to eight years,89 and generally begin to
run when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury. °0 A strict
liability action must be initiated within three years from the day
on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have
become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of
85. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 8(2). "The liability of the producer
may be reduced or disallowed when, having regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or
any person for whom the injured person is responsible." Id.
86. See, e.g., Vargas v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that
where plaintiff voluntarily exposes herself to a known or obvious danger, plaintiff is
deemed to have assumed the risk of harm and cannot recover), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1304
(3d Cir. 1981).
87. See, e.g., Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984) (holding that all tort actions are subject to a comparative negligence statute); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (holding that contributory negligence focuses on the reasonableness of actor's conduct). But see Simpson v. General
Motors Corp., 483 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1985) (consumer's failure to discover or guard
against product defect should not be used as a damage-reducing factor).
88. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 10.
89. See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling
that one-year statute of limitations had run against plaintiff suing manufacturer of
Dalkon Shield); Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1983) (two-year statute of limitations applies in strict liability actions); Dortch v. A.H. Robins Co., 650
P.2d 1046 (Or. 1982) (eight-year statute of limitations applies to strict liability
actions).
90. See, e.g., Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978) (action for selective
wire surgical suture accrued when plaintiff discovered defect); Wojcik v. Almase, 451
N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 1983) (cause of action accrued when catheter broke in body, not
when it was discovered); Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 278 S.E.2d 333 (S.C.
1981) (cause of action accrued at time defective pistol discharged).
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the producer. 9 1 The statute of limitations under the Strict Liability Directive is much more generous, because the limitations
period does not begin to run until the defect and identity of
92
the producer are also revealed to the plaintiff.
Some states in the United States have statutes of repose, but
many do not. 93 Under article 1 1 of the directive, no suits may
be brought later than ten years from the date on which the
producer put the product into circulation. 94
Lastly, under article 17 of the directive, a manufacturer may
be able to defend against a strict liability claim by proving that
the product that caused the damage was put into circulation
before the Strict Liability Directive was implemented in the
member state of venue.9 5 This defense certainly will disappear
over time, but should be quite viable during the early years of
the applicability of the directive.
III.
A.

PRODUCT SAFETY AND DESIGN

Proposed Product Safety Directive

The European Community considers product safety a basic
requirement to the creation of the one-market system. The
European Community's commitment to product safety is reflected in the Proposed Directive Concerning General Product
Safety. 9 6 The proposed directive establishes an overall requirement that no products should present "any risk" or "only
those [risks] reduced to such a level ... considered as acceptable and consistent with a high standard of protection for the
91. See supra note 90.
92. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 10(1). But see id. art. 10(2) ("The
Laws of Member States regulating suspension or interruption of the limitation period
shall not be affected by this directive.").
93. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 11. A statute of repose is distinguishable from a statute of limitations in that a statute of repose cuts off all rights to
legal action after a specified time. Kline v.J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564, 567 (D.C.
Ill. 1981). This time is usually measured from the delivery of a product or the completion of work, regardless of time of accrual of a cause of action or notice of invasion
of legal rights. See, e.g., Universal Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla.
1984).
94. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 11.
95. Id. art. 17. "This directive shall not apply to products put into circulation
before the date on which the provisions referred to in Article 19 enter into force."
Id.
96. Council Directive 156/07, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning General Product Safety, 1990 Oj. (C 156) 8 [hereinafter Proposed Product
Safety Directive].
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safety and health of persons." 97 It proceeds, in a rather radical
way, to require permanent monitoring of marketed products to
ensure that no unacceptable risks occur in the use of those
products. 98 It also places a duty on the individual countries to
ensure that surveillance occurs.9 9 The legislation covers both
consumer and non-consumer products.' 00 These provisions
go far beyond anything that has been required in the United
States. '0 '
The need for more precise warning labels is clearly delineated in the Proposed Product Safety Directive. Article 3 requires that warnings "provide the potential user or consumer
with the relevant information to enable him to assess the risks
presented by a product when such risks are acceptable as such
but are not immediately obvious and are not insignificant
"102

This proposed directive is clearly supplementary and does
not restrict the applicability of the Strict Liability and Machinery Directives. '" Its impact will be substantial. It inevitably
will result in increasingly severe safety standards being placed
on products. Its labeling and monitoring requirements go far
beyond anything currently required by American products liability law. Depending on the extent to which risk assessment
or cost benefit analysis is made a part of European Community
strict liability law, the implications of this directive for product
manufacturers, and the impact on their potential liability, will
be significant.
B.

The Machinery Directive

On June 14, 1989, the Council of the European Community
passed a Council Directive, 91/368, which concerns machinery
safety.' 0 4 The Machinery Directive provides insight into how
the increased product safety concern reflected in the Proposed
97. Id. art. 2(b) ("safe product").
98. Id. art. 3.
99. Id. art. 5.
100. Id. art. 2(a).
101. See generally Victor Schwartz, The Postsale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in
the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983).
102. Proposed Product Safety Directive, supra note 96, art. 3(2).
103. See id. pmbl., art. 13.
104. Council Directive 91/368 Amending Directive 89/392 on the Approximation
of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Machinery, 1991 O.J. (L 198) 16 [hereinafter Machinery Directive].

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/3

16

19921

Scott: Product Liability Laws in the European Community in 1992
EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY

Product Safety Directive will be implemented. Also, when read
in conjunction with the Strict Liability Directive, the Machinery
Directive has potentially great ramifications for U.S. companies
selling machinery in the EC.
The Machinery Directive creates uniform design and safety
requirements for machinery. It has the dual purpose of promoting safety and eliminating barriers to trade arising from
the member states' differing safety standards. 10 5 The directive
requires manufacturers, or their authorized representatives, to
certify, in accordance with specified procedures, that their
products comply with European Community standards. 06
The precise certification procedures to be followed depend
upon the type of product involved. Certain types of machines
0 7
are subject to more restrictive certification procedures.1
Manufacturers selling products in Europe after 1992 must be
familiar with the certification process.
1. Harmonization and Mutual Recognition
To understand how the Machinery Directive is intended to
operate, one must first understand the concepts of "harmonization" and "mutual recognition" and how they relate to the
single market system. The free circulation of products, including machinery, within Europe requires that the technical standards used to design and construct those products be uniform
or "harmonized." Otherwise, the differing technical standards
of the member states will continue to be a barrier to the free
flow of goods. The European Community has concluded that
this "harmonization" of technical norms is necessary to protect
health, safety, and the environment.' 08
Historically, the adoption of binding regulations at the European Community level required the unanimous agreement of
all member states.' 0 9 Initially, little progress was made toward
the unification of the European Community because unanimity
was nearly impossible to achieve." 0 Now, the principle of
105. Id. pmbl., at 9-10.
106. Id. ch. II (certification procedure).
107. Id. ch. II, art. 8; see also id. annex IV (listing machinery subject to article 8
procedures).
108. See generally id. pmbl., at 9-10.
109. MARK BREALEY & CONOR QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 47 (1989).
110. Id.
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"mutual recognition" permits the European Community to
proceed by way of directives, such as the Machinery Directive,
which require all member states to pass consistent implementing legislation."' The process of unifying the laws of the European Community may be compared to a system in the
United States which would require acts of Congress to be approved by all fifty states. The Machinery Directive is an example of the new "mutual recognition" approach to
harmonization, which means that implementing legislation can
contain some local provisions that do not change a directive's
basic provisions.' 12
2.

The Directive's Purpose

The clear purpose of the Machinery Directive is to establish
a high level of machine safety for consumers and workers."' 3 It
is therefore consistent with the strong consumer protection
purpose of the Strict Liability Directive." 4 The Machinery Directive is, in part, a recognition that the member states "are
responsible for insuring the health and safety on their territory
of their people.., and in particular, of workers notably in relation to the risks arising out of the use of machinery.""' 5 The
focus on protecting workers is illustrated by the special treatment given certain types of industrial products." 6 Seven annexes expand upon and implement the thirteen articles of the
directive. "7
The directive seeks to improve machine safety in the member states and proclaims that the "social cost of the large
number of accidents caused directly by the use of machinery
can be reduced by inherently safe design and construction ' of8
machinery and by proper installations and maintenance." "1
In addition, in keeping with the fundamental goal of creating
one market and removing obstacles to the movement of products within the European Community, the Machinery Directive
111. Id. at 48; see also Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. IV, art. 13.
112. See BREALEY & QUIGLEY, supra note 109, at 49; see also Machinery Directive,
supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10.
113. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10
114. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, pmbl.
115. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10.
116. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2), annex IV (imposing stricter certification requirements on
specified woodworking and molding machines).
117. Id. annex I-VII.
118. Id. pmbl., at 9-10.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/3
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establishes a certification procedure by which products are
deemed safe and are therefore entitled to be freely distributed
within the EC." 9
In keeping with the goal of raising the current level of machinery safety, the directive requires manufacturers to take
measures "to eliminate any risk of accident throughout the
foreseeable lifetime of the machinery."' 120 Manufacturers are
also required to inform users of machinery "of the residual risk
due to any shortcomings of the protection measures
adopted," 1 2 as well as to design the machinery "to prevent
abnormal use if such use would engender a risk."' 122 While
these safety objectives likely will result in increased consumer
protection, U.S. manufacturers must realize that accomplishment of these objectives may require a heightened awareness
of safety issues.
3.

The Directive's Scope: What Constitutes "Machinery"

The Machinery Directive applies to broad categories of machinery. Article 1, section 2, states: "For the purposes of this
Directive, 'machinery' means an assembly of linked parts or
components, at least one of which moves, with the appropriate
actuators, control and power circuits, etc., joined together for
a specific application, in particular for the processing, treatment, moving or packaging of a material."'' 23 Section 2 continues, "the term 'machinery' also covers an assembly of
machines which, in order to achieve the same end, are arranged and controlled so that they function as an integral
whole." 24
Machinery
also means
"interchangeable
1 25
equipment."'

This is obviously a very broad definition. In determining
whether a particular product falls within the definition, the
breadth of the definition, considered with the consumer safety
purpose of the directive, likely requires an inclusive interpretation, especially in the absence of other directives specifically
covering the product. However, certain products are specifi119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. ch. II, art. 8.
Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(a).
Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(b).
Id.
Id. ch. I, art. 1(2).
Id.
Id.
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cally excluded from the scope of the definition. These include
lifting equipment designed or constructed for raising or moving persons, machinery for medical use used in direct contact
with patients, special equipment for use in fairgrounds or
amusement parks, steam boilers, tanks and pressure vessels,
machinery specially designed or put into service for nuclear
purposes, radioactive sources forming part of a machine, firearms, and storage tanks and pipeline for petrol,26diesel fuel, inflammable liquids, and dangerous substances.1
The Machinery Directive does not cover products specifically covered by other directives. 127 At present, there are specific directives proposed or adopted relating to a number of
products that probably fall within the scope of the Machinery
29
Directive, including tower cranes,' 28 household appliances,
hydraulic diggers, 30 lawn mowers,' 3 1 toys,13 2 telecommunications equipment,1 33 motor vehicles, 1 34 and agriculture and for126. Id. ch. I, art. 1(3).
127. Id. ch. I, art. 1(4).
128. Council Directive 87/405, Amending Directive 84/534, on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power
Level of Tower Cranes, 1987 O.J. (L 220) 60.
129. Council Directive 86/594 on Airborne Noise Emitted by Household Appliances, 1986 Oj. (L 344) 24.
130. Council Directive 86/662 on the Limitation of Noise Emitted by Hydraulic
Excavators, Rope-Operated Excavators, Dozers, Loaders and Excavator-Loaders,
1986 Oj. (L 384) 86.
131. Council Directive 88/181, Amending Directive 84/538, on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power
Level of Lawnmowers, 1988 O.J. (L 81) 71; see also Commission Directive 87/252,
Adapting to Technical Progress, Council Directive 84/538 on the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power Level of
Lawnmowers, 1987 OJ. (L 117) 22.
132. Council Directive 88/378 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Concerning the Safety of Toys, 1988 Oj. (L 378) 88.
133. Council Directive 91/263 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual
Recognition of their Conformity, 1991 O.J. (L 128) 1.
134. Council Directive 76/761 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Motor-Vehicle Headlamps Which Function as Main-Beam and/or
Dipped-Beam Headlamps and to Incandescent Electric Filament Lamps for Such
Headlamps, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 1; Council Directive No. 89/297 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Lateral Protection (Side
Guards) of Certain Motor Vehicles and Their Trailers, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 1; see also
Commission Directive 89/517, Adapting to Technical Progress Council Directive 76/
761 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to MotorVehicle Headlamps Which Function as Main-Beam and/or Dipped Beam Headlamps
and to Incandescent Electric Filament Lamps for Such Headlamps, 1989 Oj. (L 265)
15.
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estry tractors.
4.

3 5

Standards and Certification

Article 4 of the Machinery Directive is the key provision for
the elimination of technical barriers and the implementation of
the mutual recognition and harmonization principles discussed
above. Article 4 prohibits member states from restricting or
impeding in any way the entry into their respective territories
of machinery that complies with the provisions of the Machinery Directive.' 36 Article 5 embellishes this principle by requiring member states to regard all machinery that bears a mark
and is accompanied by a declaration of conformity as conforming to the essential health and safety requirements of the
37
directive.'
a.

Creation of Standards

Machinery manufacturers should pay special attention to article 5 of the Machinery Directive, which controls the standards
by which machinery sold in the European Community will be
39
judged. 3 8 At present, there are two levels of standards.
The first are national standards and are provided by the various member states.' 4 ' The second level is the "harmonized"
or European standards.' 4 ' Since the goal of the directive is
harmonization, these are likely to replace the national
42
standards.
The Machinery Directive assumes the existence of harmonized standards. In reality, harmonized standards have been
relatively slow in coming and are probably not as well developed as the Machinery Directive anticipated. As a result,
135. Council Directive 89/173 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Certain Components and Characteristics of Wheeled Agricultural
or Forestry Tractors, 1988 O.J. (L 67) 1.
136. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. I, art. 4(1).
137. Id. ch. I, art. 5 (particulars necessary for European Community declaration of
conformity appear in annex II); id. annex II, (A) & (B); see also id. annex I.
138. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. I, art. 5.
139. Id.
140. Id. Member states must bring important, relevant national standards to the
attention of those doing business in the area of the directive. Important and relevant
standards are those necessary for the proper implementation of the essential safety
and health requirements in annex I to the Machinery Directive. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. pmbl., at 9-10 (recognizing the advantages of a harmonized system).
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American manufacturers should be careful to monitor new developments in the standards. Harmonized standards are being
formulated by two committees: the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).' 43 These developments will determine the standards American machinery
products must meet in Europe and will identify the authorities
with which American manufacturers can work to achieve
compliance.
b.

Certification Procedures

Article 811 4 sets forth the certification procedures that apply
to article 5 standards and implements the harmonization principle. 14 5 The certification procedure to be followed depends
upon the type of product. It varies from manufacturer's determination of compliance to detailed testing by a properly certified laboratory.' 4 6 There are two main product
areas: annex
47
IV machinery and non-annex IV machinery. 1

143. Id. These committees are recognized by the Commission as competent to
adopt the harmonized standards. In fact, the definition of harmonized standard is a
technical specification adopted by either the CEN or the CENELEC. See id.
144. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8.
145. Id. ch. I, art. 5(1).
146. See id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(a)-(c).
147. Non-annex IV machinery is any machinery not listed in annex IV. See Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8. Annex IV machinery is:
1. Circular saws (single- or multi-blade) for working with wood and
meat.
1.1 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a fixed
bed with manual feed of the workpiece or with a demountable power feed.
1.2 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a manually operated reciprocating saw-bench or carriage.
1.3 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a builtin mechanical feed device for the workpieces, with manual loading and/or
unloading.
1.4 Sawing machines with movable tool during operation, with a
mechanical feed device and manual loading and/or unloading.
2. Hand-fed surface planing machines for woodworking.
3. Thicknessers for one-side dressing with manual loading and/or unloading for woodworking.
4. Band-saws with a mobile bed or carriage and manual loading and/
or unloading for working with wood and meat.
5. Combined machines of the types referred to in 1 to 4 and 7 for
woodworking.
6. Hand-fed tenoning machines with several tool holders for woodworking.
7. Hand-fed vertical spindle moulding machines.
8. Portable chain saws for woodworking.
9. Presses, including press-brakes, for the cold working of metals, with
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For machinery not included in annex IV, the certification
process is fairly straightforward, relying heavily on the integrity of the manufacturer. 4 8 Unlike products included in annex
IV, which are apparently deemed by the directive to be in special need of safety regulation,149 compliance for non-annex IV
products is governed by the decisions of the
manufacturer,
50
subject to policing by the certifying bodies.
The manufacturer of a non-annex IV product is required to
"draw up the file provided for in Annex V.' 5" Annex V requires the manufacturer to compile a technical file consisting
of an overall drawing of the machinery, detailed drawings, a
list of the essential requirements of the Machinery Directive,
and any relevant test reports. 52 This information must be
kept available for examination by the "competent national authorities" for at least ten years- 3 and must be drawn up154in one
of the official languages of the European Community.
Once the annex V file is assembled, the manufacturer
prepares the European Community declaration of conformity
and attaches the European Community mark.' 5 5 The European Community declaration of conformity must contain the
name of the manufacturer, a description of the machinery, and
an identification of the applicable standards. 5 6 The declaration likely will become part of the literature distributed with
the machinery and will also be placed in the annex V technical
manual loading and/or unloading, whose movable working parts may have a
travel exceeding 6 mm and a speed exceeding 30 mm/s.
10. Injection or compression plastics-moulding machines with manual
loading or unloading.
11. Injection or compression rubber-moulding machines with manual
loading or unloading.
12. Cartridge-operated fixing guns.
Id. annex IV.
148. See id. pmbl., at 10. "Manufacturers should retain the responsibility for certifying the conformity of their machinery to the relevant essential requirements ...
whereas it is left to the sole discretion of the manufacturer, where he feels the need,
to have his products examined by a third party ...." Id. pmbl., at 10.
149. Id. "For certain types of machinery having a higher risk factor, a stricter certification procedure is desirable .
Id.
150. See id.annex V.
151. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(a).
152. See id. annex II(3)(a).
153. Id. annex IV(4)(b).
154. Id. annex V(4)(c).
155. Id. annex V(2); see also annex III (replicating the "EC" symbol).
156. Id. annex V (establishing criteria for required conformity declaration).
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file.' 5 7 The European Community mark consists of the European Community symbol, "CE," followed by the last two digits
of the year in which the mark was affixed.' 5 8 The mark must be
attached to the machinery "distinctly and visibly"; marks which
may be confused with the European Community symbol may
15 9
not be put on the machinery.
No additional testing or procedures are required for nonannex IV products. In essence, the manufacturer determines
whether the machinery complies with applicable standards,
prepares the annex V technical file and the declaration of conformity, and attaches the European Community mark. The
penalty for fraudulently certifying compliance is not specifically set out in the Machinery Directive, but article 7, section 3
allows member states to "take appropriate action" against the
manufacturer. 160 The precise penalty likely will be left to the
member states to determine, but may be criminal in nature.
c.

Annex IV Machinery

The directive targets the machinery listed in annex IV as being in special need of safety certification procedures.' 6 ' This
list of products includes saws, presses, and rubber and plastic
molding machines.' 6 2 These machines are generally used in
the industrial work place. The industrial worker is thus the
chief benefactor of the safety features of the Machinery Directive. Heightened regulation will not surprise U.S. manufacturers of annex IV machinery because many of these machines
already are subject to special regulation in the United
63
States. 1
Because of the special concern these products engender, it is
quite likely that specific harmonized standards will soon be in
place for these products, resulting in considerably less guess157. Id. Failure to produce the documentation when requested by national authorities may result in a presumption of non-conformity with directive requirements.
Id.
158. Id. annex III; see also id. ch. III, art. 10.
159. Id. ch. III, art. 10.
160. Id. ch. I, art. 7(3).
161. See id. ch. II, art. 8; see also annex IV.
162. Id. annex IV.
163. See, e.g., Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational
Safety and Health Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969 (1987); G. Marc Whitehead &
Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: ProductLiability and the Machinery Directive-WhatLiability for U.S. Manufacturers?, 388 PLI/Lit. (PLI) 63, Apr. 5, 1990.
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work for their manufacturers. However, determining which
certification procedures apply depends upon a number of variables, including, perhaps, the sophistication of the
manufacturer.
d.

The Players

To understand the certification procedures, one must first
be aware of the principal players: the manufacturer, the "notified body," and the "certifying authority."'' 6 4 The notified
body is the laboratory responsible for determining whether
machinery complies with applicable standards. 6 5 Certifying
authorities review the testing data of the notified bodies and
make decisions regarding certification compliance. 66 The directive does not expressly provide for these authorities and
one must read between the lines to ascertain their existence.
The European Community is now taking measures to adopt
criteria for appointing certifying bodies. 167 The likely outcome
is that each member state will have one certifying body analyzing the data of the notified bodies. In some smaller member
states, the notified body may also be the certifying body, resulting in one-step manufacturer compliance.
Article 9 requires that each member state notify the Commission of the European Community and other member states
of its body or bodies approved for carrying out the article 8
certification procedures.' 68 The commission is required to
publish the list of approved bodies in the OfficialJournal of the
European Communities and to ensure that the list is current. 6 9 In
the implementation of the certification procedure, manufacturers will likely choose an approved body based on the speed
with which the body can deliver a decision.
e.

The Procedures

The particular certification procedure to be followed depends upon a number of factors and utilizes an increasingly
greater level of scrutiny, depending upon compliance with ex164. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8.
165. Id. annex VII (providing for the establishment by member states of notifying

bodies).
166.
167.
168.
169.

See id. ch. II, art. 8.
See generally Whitehead & Scott, supra note 163.
Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 9.
Id.
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isting standards, the sophistication of the manufacturer, and
70
the manufacturer's need for certainty.
Where machinery listed in annex IV fails to comply or partially complies with the harmonized standards or if no standards exist, the manufacturer must submit an example of the
machinery for the full-scale examination set out in annex VI.,7,
This examination is conducted by a notified body, and compliance must be certified. 72 This testing and procedure is most
rigorous under the Machinery Directive and reflects the directive's concern about annex IV products that do not fully comply with existing harmonized standards, or for which no
standards exist.
Where annex IV machinery meets a harmonized standard
pursuant to article 5(2), one procedure allows a manufacturer
to create an annex VI file-the same file required for a fullscale examination-and forward it to a notified body which will
acknowledge receipt and keep it. 1 7 3 At this level, the manufacturer is allowed to comply in much the same manner as the
manufacturer of non-annex IV products is allowed to do, so
long as a more detailed technical file is kept. 74 The manufacturer must inform the notified body of any modifications to the
product, including minor modifications. 75 The manufacturer
also must create the technical file in the language of the member state where the notified body is established or in some
1 76
other language acceptable to the notified body.
Under a second, more stringent procedure, the manufacturer creates the same technical file as it would under the first
procedure, but the notified body must first verify that the product complies with the harmonized standards and then create a
certificate of adequacy for the technical file. 17 7 While the directive is not clear as to what will be required for the notified
body to "verify that the standards .... have been correctly ap170. Id. ch. I, arts. 5,6; ch. II, art. 9.
171. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(b).
172. Id. annex VI, §§ 3-4.
173. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
174. Compare id. annex V(3) (describing the technical construction file required for
machinery not referred to in annex IV) with id. annex VI(2) (describing the technical
file required for machinery referred to in annex IV). Remember, non-annex IV manufacturers need only maintain an annex V file.
175. Id. annex VI, § 5.
176. Id. annex VI, § 7.
177. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
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• plied," 17 8 it will undoubtedly require some degree of testing.
The directive is therefore more likely to result in the reversal
of a manufacturer's decision that its product complies with the
directive. The same requirements apply with regard to notification of changes.' 79 In addition, a notified body that refuses
to issue an examination certificate must inform other notified
bodies of its decision. 80 This is done so that a manufacturer
cannot go to a different notified body to achieve compliance.
The third procedure requires a manufacturer to submit the
machinery for a full-scale, annex VI examination.' 8 ' This may
be done by a manufacturer to verify its own decision that the
machinery is in compliance or may be required of the manufacturer if a policing
body believes the product to be non82
conforming.

Regardless of which certification procedure is required,
manufacturers must realize that once the European Community mark is in place and the certification procedures are completed, the manufacturer is responsible for complying with all
other applicable directives. The mark must indicate that the
8
machinery also fulfills the requirements of those directives.1 3
Some machinery will likely be governed by other directives.
For example, machinery powered by electricity may also be
governed by the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.' 84
Manufacturers must be aware of, and in compliance with, all
applicable directives before marketing the machinery.
IV.

A.

WARNINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The Duty To Warn and Instruct
1.

United States

In the United States, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
dangers that are known or reasonably foreseeable at the time
178. Id. annex VI, § 3.
179. Id. annex VI, § 5.
180. Id. annex VI, § 6.

181. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
182. Id. pmbl., at 10 ("manufacturers should retain the responsibility for certifying the conformity of their machinery").
183. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8(5).
184. Council Directive 89/336 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Electromagnetic Compatibility, 1989 Oj. (L 139) 19.
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of marketing the product.' 8 5 A manufacturer also must warn
against reasonably foreseeable misuses and unintended uses
that could cause injury or damage. 186 This requires a manufacturer to consider the product in the context in which it will be
used, consider the persons who will use it, and determine how
the product might foreseeably be used or misused in a manner
not intended by the manufacturer.

87

A manufacturer must

also instruct the user how to operate the product safely.' 88 Exceptions to this duty to warn include open or obvious dandangers
gers, Is 9 commonly known dangers, 9 ° 9unforeseeable
2
and uses, 19 1 and knowledgeable users.

2.

The Strict Liability Directive

The Strict Liability Directive does not expressly create a duty
to warn or instruct. Instead, a duty is implied in the definition
of a defective product. 19 As noted earlier, article 6, section 1,
provides that a product is defective "when it does not provide
the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including; (a) the presentation of the
product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected
that the product would be put; [and] (c) the time when the
product was put into circulation."' 94 Although warnings and
instructions are not specifically addressed under article 6, the
"presentation of the product" may be interpreted to include
warnings and instructions. Warnings and instructions also
may be required if the reasonably expected uses of the product
185. A manufacturer's duty to warn about a product's inherent risk is derived
from negligence law, Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963)
(applying Oregon law), but a failure to warn against risks created by a product's defects may also render the product unreasonably dangerous for purposes of imposing
strict liability, Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480 (11 th Cir. 1986) (applying
Georgia law).
186. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
187. Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980).
188. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn.
1977).
Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1987).
189. See, e.g.,
190. See, e.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1986).
Stabnick v. Williams Patrol Serv., 390 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App.
191. See, e.g.,
1986) (holding that defendant had no duty to warn of strong gusty wind, which blew
debris from some unknown place and blinded employee leaving building for which
defendant provided security services).
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 469 A.2d 943 (NJ. 1983).
192. See, e.g.,
193. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
194. Id.
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involve hazards that do "not provide the safety which a person
is entitled to expect." Therefore, a product may be found to
be defective under the Strict Liability Directive if it lacks adequate warnings and instructions. 9 5
3.

The Machinery Directive

The Machinery Directive, in contrast to the Strict Liability
Directive, expressly creates a duty to warn and instruct. 96 The
Machinery Directive requires a manufacturer to "inform users
of the residual risks due to any shortcomings of the protection
measures adopted, indicate whether any particular training is
required and specify any need to provide personal protection
equipment."' 197 The directive also requires warnings "where
risks remain despite all the measures adopted or in the case of
potential risks that are not evident (for example, electrical
cabinets, radioactive sources, bleeding of a hydraulic circuit,
hazard in an unseen area, etc.).' 9 8 It is not clear whether
these warnings should be placed directly on the machine or in
an instruction book. In the United States, manufacturers generally place the warnings in appropriate locations on the product and in an instruction manual.'

99

The Machinery Directive also expressly creates a duty to
provide instructions.2 "0 All machinery must be accompanied
by instructions. These instructions must include certain specific information, including information required to establish
that the machinery complies with safety certification standards;
instructions for safely servicing, using, assembling, and maintaining the machinery; and the foreseeable uses of the machinery. 20 ' With the exception of the safety certification
information, these requirements are similar to U.S. requirements for instruction manuals.
195. See Kenneth Ross & Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: Warnings and Instructions
Under the Strict Liability, Machinery, and ProposedProduct Safety Directives, 388 PLI/Lit. 49
(PLI) Apr. 5, 1990.
196. See generally Machinery Directive, supra note 104, annex I (essential health and
safety requirements).

197. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(b).
198.
199.
1986);
1974).
200.
201.

Id. annex I, § 1.7.2.
See, e.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. Ct. App.
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.
See id. annex I, § 1.7.
Id. annex I, § 1.7.4.
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The Proposed Product Safety Directive

The Proposed Product Safety Directive also requires warnings and instructions. The term "safe product" is defined, in
part, as meaning:
[A]ny product which, during its foreseeable time of use,
does not present any risk or only those reduced to such a
level, taking account of the product's use, considered as acceptable and consistent with a high standard of protection
for safety and health of persons . . .given its composition,
... wrapping, presentation and labelling, conditions of assembly, maintenance
or disposal, [or] instructions for
20 2
handling.

Inadequate labeling and instructions therefore render a product "dangerous. '"203
Article 3, subsection 2, of the Proposed Product Safety Directive expressly requires that suppliers "provide the potential
user or consumer with the relevant information to enable him
to assess the risks presented by a product when such risks are
'20 4
acceptable as such but are not insignificant.
Presumably, this "relevant information" is to be communicated by way of instructions and warnings. The same warnings
must inform the potential user or consumer of precautions that
can be taken against the risks throughout the foreseeable time
of use of the product. 20 5 Article 3 also makes clear that providing a warning does not "constitute a means of escaping the
general safety requirement nor a defense when the product
proves to be dangerous. 20 6 This appears to be an acknowledgement of the safety hierarchy; namely dangers should be
designed out, guarded against if they cannot be designed out,
and then warned against as a last resort.
The Machinery, Strict Liability, and Proposed Product Safety
Directives create a duty to provide appropriate warnings and
instructions. This duty is very similar to the legal standard in
the United States. Precisely what constitutes an inadequate
warning or an adequate instruction under the directives is less
202. Proposed Product Safety Directive, supra note 96.
203. Id. art. 2(c) ("any product which does not meet the definition of'safe product' according to" part (b) of this article).
204. Id. art. 3(2).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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clear, although the Machinery Directive and Proposed Product
Safety Directive do give some guidance.
B.

Adequacy of Warnings and Instructions
1.

United States

In the United States, the courts have provided some guidelines for manufacturers to utilize in analyzing the adequacy of
warnings. For example, it has been held that an adequate
warning is one that reasonably could be expected to catch the
attention of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances
of its use, and one where the content is understandable and
conveys a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger
to that person.20 7 Other courts have defined the message of an
adequate warning as one which clearly communicates the nature of the risk so that the user will understand it, the seriousness of the risk involved, and information that will allow the
user to avoid the risk.20 8 Manufacturers also must consider the
conspicuousness of the warning, the use of symbols or pictorials to convey appropriate messages, the location of the warning label, and the clarity of the warning language. 2 0' Although
the courts have not made any definitive rulings on the use of
pictorials, an American National Standards Institute standard
encourages the use of pictorials that are readily understood,
effectively communicate the message, and provide the viewer
with an immediate opportunity to recognize an existing
hazard.21 0
Instructions affirmatively guide the user in the proper and
safe use of the product. The warnings on the product and in
the instruction book should be interrelated. The adequacy of
the instructions is generally judged in the same manner as
warnings. In writing the instructions, the manufacturer must
consider such things as the ultimate reader's education and experience, mechanical aptitude, manual dexterity, and intelligence. Also, the instructions should be written to reach the
lowest common denominator. It is better for the book to be
too simple than too complex.
207. See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d
868 (Tex. 1974).
208. See, e.g., Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624 (Or. 1982).
209. See, e.g., Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. 1984).
210.

See generally Ross & Scott, supra note 195.
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The Strict Liability Directive

The Strict Liability Directive does not expressly describe or
discuss the content of warnings and instructions. Presumably,
an adequate warning or instruction under this directive would
be one that provides "the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account. ' 2 1' The content
of the warning or instruction under this directive is of primary
importance to the manufacturer because the Strict Liability Directive allows a manufacturer to reduce or avoid liability when
the damages are caused in part by the fault of the injured person. 2 12 This means that a manufacturer could raise as a defense a person's failure to read or comply with an adequate
warning or instruction. The three factors used to determine
adequacy under U.S. law are noticeably absent from the Strict
Liability Directive.
3.

The Machinery Directive

The adequacy requirements of the Machinery Directive generally follow the U.S. requirements quite closely. For example,
the information needed to control the machinery must be unambiguous and easily understood.2 13 Warnings must not be
excessive to the point of "overloading" the operator.21 4 Instructions for machinery that may be used by "non-professional" operators must "take into account the level of general
education and acumen that can reasonably be expected from
'
such operators. "215

In addition to these general requirements, the Machinery Directive contains a number of specific requirements for the content of warnings and instructions that may go beyond U.S.
requirements. For example, if machinery is intended for use in
a potentially explosive atmosphere, a manufacturer must indicate that fact on the machinery. 2 6 The instructions must contain the manufacturer's statement of both the normal use of
the machinery and uses that reasonably could be expected.
The instructions must specifically point "to ways-which expe211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
Id. art. 7(b).
Machinery Directive, supra note 104, annex I, § 1.7.
Id. annex I, § 1.7.0.
Id. annex I, § 1.7.4(h).
Id. annex I, § 1.7.3.
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rience has shown might occur-in which the machinery should
not be used.

' 21 7

This is similar to the U.S. concept of warning

about foreseeable misuses, but it seems to go further and require some type of post-sale updating.
If the machine runs the risk of breakup during operation, the
manufacturer must indicate in the instructions the type and
frequency of inspection and maintenance required for safety
reasons. 2 18 The manufacturer must also indicate the parts subject to wear and tear and the criteria for replacement. 21 9 The
instructions also must contain drawings and diagrams that are
necessary for putting the machinery into service, maintaining
and inspecting it, and operating it safely. 220 These are identical to the U.S. requirements. The instructions also must inform the operator of the installation and assembly
requirements necessary to reduce noise or vibration. 22 1 Lastly,

the directive requires that the manufacturer's sales literature
not contradict the instructions with regard to safety.222
Many of these requirements generally go beyond what
would be required under U.S. law. Of course, these requirements will be supplemented by those found in any directive
applying to a specific product.
4.

The Proposed Product Safety Directive

The Proposed Product Safety Directive does not contain
specific requirements for the content of warning labels or instructions. However, article 3 requires that suppliers provide
the user or consumer with sufficient information to enable him
to assess risks associated with the product that may be acceptable but neither immediately obvious nor insignificant.223 The
supplier must also inform the user or consumer how to take
precautions against these risks throughout the foreseeable life
of the product. 224
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. annex
Id. annex
Id.
Id. annex
Id. annex
Id. annex
Proposed
Id.

I, § 1.1.2(c).
I, § 1.1.2.
I, § 1.7.4.(a).
I, § 1.7.4.(e).
I, § 1.7.4.(d).
Product Safety Directive, supra note 96, art. 3(2).
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LIABILITY FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY

The European Community is considering implementing a
directive creating strict liability for the suppliers of services.2 2 5
The scope of the Proposed Service Directive is very broad, encompassing architects to mechanics, day care providers to doctors, playground supervisors to hotel operators, and plumbers
to electricians. 2 26 The ramifications of this proposed directive
cannot be overstated. It is very important for all service providers to monitor its progress and prepare for its
implementation.
A.

Theory of Liability

A preliminary draft of the Proposed Service Directive begins
with the somewhat innocuous statement that "the supplier of a
service shall be liable for damage caused by a safety defect in
his service." 22 7 The focus of liability is not the reasonableness
of the service provider's conduct but the notion of "safety defects" and the expectations of the public. 2 2s The commentary
to the preliminary draft directive made clear that "the aim is to
introduce objective liability on the part of the supplier of de22 9
fective services, regardless of any concept of fault.
Thus, it is clear that the Proposed Service Directive would
replace negligence with strict liability. Presently, article 1
reads:
The supplier of a service shall be liable for damage to the
health and physical integrity of persons or the physical integrity of movable or immovable property, including the
persons or property which were the object of the service,
caused by a fault committed by him in the performance of
the service. 25 °
In addition, paragraph 3 of article 1 clearly states that the
concept of "fault" referenced in paragraph 1 is indeed negli225. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Liability of Suppliers of Services,
1990 OJ. (C 12) 8 [hereinafter Proposed Service Directive].
226. Id. pmbl.
227. Preliminary Draft Directive Concerning the Strict Liability of Services with a
Safety Defect, art. 1, (Nov. 6, 1989) (On file with the William Mitchell Law Review)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft Services Directive].
228. Id. art. 5.
229. Id. pmbl.
230. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/3

34

Scott: Product Liability Laws in the European Community in 1992
EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY

1992]

gence-based. Paragraph 3 provides, "In assessing the fault, account shall be taken of the behavior of the supplier of the
service, who, in normal and reasonably foreseeable conditions,
23
shall ensure the safety which may reasonably be expected." '
Thus, at present, the focus of the analysis is on the conduct of
the supplier of the service, not merely on damage and
causation.
B.

Scope of the Proposed Directive
1.

Who Is a Service Provider?

The phrase "supplier of services" is defined in article 3 as
any natural or legal person governed by private or public law
who, in the course of his professional activities or by way of a
'
public service, provides a service referred to in Article 2. 232

This is an extremely broad definition with few exceptions.
Both commercial traders and public entities are included
within the scope of the definition.2 3 The policy behind the
definition is to ensure that the person who derives the commercial or public gain from a service is held responsible for
their superior technical knowledge. However, the directive
does not apply to public services intended to maintain public
safety, or to package travel or waste services. 3 4 Franchisors
23 5
and franchisees are both deemed to be suppliers of services
and are deemed to be jointly and severally liable.2 3 6 However,
a franchisor and franchisee may avoid liability in certain situations.23 7 It is not clear whether notified or certifying bodies
provided for under the Machinery or other Directives fall
within the scope of this Proposed Service Directive. As presently drafted, the directive seems to include these entities, as
well as standards-creating entities.
231. Id. art. 1(3).
232. Id. art. 3(1).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. art. 3(2), 3(3).
236. Id. art. 9.
237. Id. art. 2. The Proposed Service Directive does not apply "to damage covered by liability arrangements governed by international agreements ratified by the
Member States or by the Community." Id.
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What Is a Service?

Article 2 defines "service" as:
[A]ny transaction carried out on a commercial basis or by
way of a public service and in an independent manner,
whether or not in return for payment, which does not have
as its direct and exclusive object the manufacture of movable property or the transfer of rights in rem or intellectual
property rights.23 8
The Proposed Service Directive does not apply to damage
covered by liability arrangements governed by international
agreements ratified by the member states or by the European
Community. 23 9 Unlike the preliminary draft directive, the Proposed Service Directive does not specifically refer to health
care services, presumably meaning they are included within the
scope of the directive.
The term "service" apparently is intended to include the
physical protection of persons and their property, not their
economic protection. Only services that injure the health and
physical integrity of persons and their property are included
within the scope of the directive. This is made clear in article
4, where the term "damage" is defined as
(a) death or any other direct damage to the health or physical integrity of persons;
(b) any direct damage to the physical integrity of movable or
immovable property, including animals, provided that this
property:
(i) is of a type normally intended for private use and consumption, and
(ii) was intended for or used by the injured person, principally for his private use or consumption;
(c) any financial material damage resulting directly from the
damage referred to at (a) and (b).2 4°
This seems to mean that professionals such as accountants,
stockbrokers, and attorneys are not covered by the directive.
Protection from financial damage is only provided where there
is also damage to a person or property.2 4 '
The preliminary draft directive specifically allowed for re238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. art. 4.
241. Id.
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covery of pain and suffering damages. 24 2 The Proposed Directive does not include pain and suffering within the definition of
"damage" and makes no reference to the issue throughout the
directive.2 43
3.

What Is a Defective Service?

Even though it purported to implement strict liability, the
preliminary draft directive included "reasonableness" concepts. For example, article 5 defined the phrase "safety defect" as a service that "does not provide the degree of safety
which may reasonably be expected as regards health and physical integrity of persons and the physical integrity of movable
and immovable property including that forming the object of
the service. ' 244 A comment to this article made clear that the
standard to be applied was that of the "reasonable expectation
245
of the public.
The Proposed Service Directive replaces the concept of a
"safety defect" with the notion of a "fault committed ...in the
performance of [a] service. "246 The word "fault" is not specifically defined. It appears to be a negligence concept, focusing
on the conduct of the supplier of the service.2 4 7 The return to
negligence concepts is certainly good news for service providers. However, the supplier of the service has the burden of
24 8
proving the absence of fault.
C. Elements of a Cause of Action
There are two elements set out in the Proposed Service Directive that an injured person must prove: (1) damage; and
(2) a causal relationship between the performance of the service and the damage.2 4 9 Unlike the preliminary draft directive,
where safety defects were "presumed" to exist, the proposed
242. Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 4(3).
243. Id. art. 4.
244. Id. art. 5.
245. Id.art. 5, cmt.
246. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).
247. See id. art. 1(3). "In assessing the fault, account shall be taken of the behavior
of the supplier of the service, who, in normal and reasonably foreseeable conditions,
shall ensure the safety which may reasonably be expected." Id.
248. Id. art. 1(2).
249. Id. art. 5. "The injured person shall be required to provide proof of the
damage and the causal relationship between the performance of the service and the
damage." Id.
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directive creates no presumption. 2 50 Once the injured persons
proves these two elements, the burden of proof then shifts to
the service supplier to prove the absence of fault. 25 ' The injured person apparently does not have to show fault or prove
that the conduct of the supplier was somehow unreasonable.
The supplier of the service has the exclusive burden of proving
the reasonableness of his conduct.
D.

Defenses Available to the Service Provider

Under the preliminary draft directive, a number of defenses
were available to service providers. For example, the service
provider was not liable if it proved that the safety defect was
due to aforce majeure.25 2 The service supplier also was not liable if the safety defect was due to compliance with binding European Community law, national legislation, or mandatory
rules laid down by public authorities.2 5 ' These defenses are
not available under the Proposed Service Directive. The only
defense apparently available is for the supplier of a service to
' 254
prove that he was not at "fault.
A notion of comparative fault is found in article VI, paragraph 2, which provides "The liability of the supplier of the
service may be reduced, or even waived, where the damage is
caused jointly by a fault on his part and by the fault of the injured person, or a person for whom the injured person is responsible. ' 25 5 The specifics of this provision are obviously
lacking. Under what circumstances will liability be "waived"?
What does it mean to "waive" liability? For what types of persons will injured persons be deemed "responsible"?
The supplier of the service may not use as a defense the fact
that the injured party's damage was caused jointly by his fault
and the fault of a third party.2 5 6 Also, the supplier may not
contractually limit or exclude his liability to the injured
person.2 5 7
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 6(2).
Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(2).
Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 7(1).
Id.
See Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(2).
Id. art. 6(2).
Id. art. 6(1).
Id. art. 7.
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E. Statutes of Limitation
An injured person must bring proceedings for recovery
within three years of the date on which the injured person became or should reasonably have become aware of the damage, 2 58 or within five years from the date the service is
provided.2 59 However, where the service relates to the design
or construction of immovable property, the five-year period is
increased to twenty years 260 and the three-year period is increased to ten years. 2 6 '
V.

POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF PRODUCT ENDORSERS UNDER THE
PROPOSED DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LIABILITY FOR

SERVICE PROVIDERS

The term "service supplier" under the Proposed Service Directive may include agencies that certify quality control systems, certify and endorse products, or create standards for
products.
A.

Liability of Product Endorsers in the United States

In the past, U.S. courts have imposed liability upon product
endorsers when a certified product causes injury. For example, when a product endorser certifies a product and places it
on its list of certified goods, plaintiffs injured by that product
may claim that the product endorser is liable under a negligence theory. 6 2 Some plaintiffs have attempted to hold product endorsers strictly liable for injuries, but courts have
rejected claims that were not based on negligence. 6 3
Courts have stressed that endorsers and certifiers voluntarily
assume a duty toward consumers when they enter into the
business of endorsing products. 2 6 Several theories of negligence have been used to impose liability. One theory is based
on misrepresentation of the amount of testing that was actually
258. Id. art. 10(i).
259. Id. art. 9.

260. Id.
261. Id. art. 10(i).
262. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
263. See, e.g., Toman v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Minn.

1982).
264. See Hanbery, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
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done. 265 For example, in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher
Corp., the court allowed a claim that a product endorser had
negligently misrepresented the amount of testing that had
been done on the design of a defective fire extinguisher.2 6 6
The plaintiff argued that the seal of the certifier indicated careful testing of the product, even when no testing occurred at
7
all.

26

Plaintiffs also have argued that certifiers and endorsers
should be held liable for negligent testing of products. One
plaintiff claimed that a product endorser failed to discover a
defect in a pair of shoes she purchased in reliance on the product endorser's seal.2 6 8 She argued that the product endorser
would have discovered this defect with diligent testing. The
court agreed, reasoning that once a product endorser has assumed a duty to test a product, it should be held liable for failing to discover defects that would have been apparent with
2 69
reasonable testing.
Finally, plaintiffs have argued that endorsers should be held
liable for failure to warn of the dangers of certain products.2 7 °
If a product endorser certifies a space heater, for instance,
courts have indicated that it might be held responsible for failing to warn purchasers that the space heater is suitable only for
use in well ventilated areas. 2 7' This theory of recovery places
the greatest burden upon certifiers as they could be held liable
for a duty that is traditionally attributed only to manufacturers.
Endorsers have limited their liability through the use of disclaimers.2 7 2 A disclaimer used by one product endorser states:
The Subscriber agrees to hold the Laboratories harmless
and to defend and indemnify the Laboratories against any
loss, expense, liability, or damage, including reasonable attorney's fees, arising out of any misuse by the Subscriber of
the Listing Mark of the Laboratories or arising out of any
violation by the Subscriber of the terms and conditions of
265. See, e.g., Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D.

Del. 1967).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 111.
268. See, e.g., Hanberry, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
269. Id.
270. Vaughn v. J.C. Penney, 822 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1987).
271. Id.
272. Toman v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Minn. 1982).
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this Agreement. 27 3

This disclaimer is intended to protect the product endorser
from claims arising from the negligence of the manufacturer
and may account for a decrease in U.S. cases in this area.
U.S. courts have thus held product endorsers liable in products liability cases when the endorser voluntarily undertakes to
test and endorse the product and this undertaking is performed negligently. Once the product endorser undertakes
this duty toward the eventual consumer, the product endorser
must exercise reasonable care in testing and disseminating information about the product. Courts have found liability
under negligence theories only, expressly rejecting strict
liability.
B.

Implicationsfor the European Community

If the European Community implements the proposed directive, U.S. case law may provide assistance to product endorsers, accrediting and certifying agencies, and standard-setting
organizations attempting to analyze their potential liability.
However, because the burden of proving the absence of fault
will be on the supplier of the service, these standard-setting
organizations may have to deal with increased liability.
1.

Accrediting and Certifying Agencies

Accrediting and certifying agencies may be liable to injured
persons or manufacturers under the directive. The analysis is
quite simple. Article 1 establishes that the "supplier of a service shall be liable for damage.

. .

caused by a fault committed

by him in the performance of the service. ' 274 If an accrediting
and certifying agency is defined as a "supplier of a service,"
and its activities are considered to be a "service," the directive
seemingly applies, and liability will result from a "fault" in the
service.
Accrediting and certifying agencies clearly are included
within the definition of "supplier of a service," which is defined as "any natural or legal person governed by private or
public law who, in the course of his professional activities or by
way of a public service, provides a service referred to in article
273. Id. at 1019.
274. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).
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II. ' ' 175

The term "service" is defined in Article 2 as:
Any transaction carried out on a commercial basis or by
way of a public service and in an independant manner,
whether or not in return for payment, which does not have
as its direct and exclusive object the manufacturer of movable property or 276
the transfer of rights in rem or intellectual
property rights.

The service of accrediting or certifying ISO 9000277 programs falls within this definition. Therefore, accrediting and
certifying agencies could be liable under the directive if the
ISO 9000 program is improperly accredited and certified and
thus contains a "fault." But, the word "fault" is not specifically
defined. Apparently the directive intends it to be a negligence
concept, focusing on the conduct of the supplier of the
service. 2781
Under the directive, unlike under the law in the United
States, the supplier of a service has the burden of proving the
absence of fault. Under article 5, the injured person is required to prove damage and a casual relationship between the
performance of the service and the damage. Under article 1,
paragraph 2, the supplier of the service then has the burden of
proving the absence of fault, meaning that the supplier's conduct was "reasonable" or ensured the safety "which may reasonably be expected."
The liability of accrediting and certifying agencies could
arise in the following context. A person is injured as a result of
a claimed defect in a product. The injured person alleges that
the defect occurred as a result of improper design of the product, possibly expressly implicating the implementation of the
ISO 9000 program. The liability of the accrediting agency may
arise in one of two ways. First, the injured party may decide to
sue the accrediting agency directly under the directive. This is
especially likely to happen if the manufacturer is bankrupt, out
of business, outside of the jurisdiction, or otherwise unable to
satisfy a judgment. Second, if the manufacturer is still in busi275, Id. art. 3(1).
276. Id. art. 2.
277. ISO 9000 is a quality assurance standard published by the International Standards Organization. It provides quality assurance standards for design, manufacturing, testing, and management.
278. See Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(3) ("account shall be
taken of the behavior of the supplier of the service").
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ness, the injured person will likely sue the manufacturer. The
manufacturer will then determine whether to sue the accrediting and certifying agency for the defects in the ISO 9000 program. Manufacturers may therefore decide to bring the
equivalent of third-party lawsuits against accrediting and certifying agencies.
The possibility that a manufacturer would sue an accrediting
and certifying agency raises interesting issues about contractual terms and indemnity agreements. Generally speaking, indemnity agreements are widely used in the United States by
product endorsers. 2 79 The agreements basically provide that
the manufacturer for whom certification services are performed agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the certifying
280
laboratory in the event of litigation.
Such an arrangement may or may not be possible under the
proposed directive. Article 7 of the directive provides that
"the supplier of a service may not, in relation to the injured
person, limit or exclude his liability under this Directive. 281
This raises the issue of what constitutes an injured person.
Does this mean the person must be actually physically injured
by the service? Could it also include a manufacturer who is
"injured" by a lawsuit brought against it as a result of alleged
problems in the ISO 9000 program? If manufacturers can be
considered injured persons, accrediting and certifying agencies may not be able to limit their liability with respect to them.
Even if manufacturers are not considered injured persons, accrediting and certifying agencies clearly cannot limit their liability to the person actually injured. This could become
particularly important where a manufacturer is insolvent or
otherwise unable to satisfy a judgment. Even if an accrediting
or certifying agency has an indemnity agreement with such a
manufacturer, it may prove to be of no value to the injured
person.
2.

Consultants

The same liability issues apply not only to accrediting and
certifying agencies but also to the ISO 9000 consultants who
279. See Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1977).
280. Id.
281. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 7.
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work with companies in setting up ISO 9000 programs. The
consultant's advice is certainly a service under the directive,
and it seemingly applies with equal, if not greater, force to
consultants.
3. Product Endorsers and Standards-CreatingOrganizations
This same analysis may also hold true for product endorsers
and standards-creating organizations. Creating standards for
the design and performance of a product and endorsing products certainly seem to constitute services, and the organizations creating the standards and endorsing the product
certainly seem to be suppliers of services. Injured persons
who claim that standards were inadequate may try to sue the
standard-setting organizations directly, or manufacturers who
are sued in cases involving allegations of deficient standards
may attempt to sue the standards-creating organization under
this directive. The same is true for product endorsers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new EC products liability scheme borrows heavily from
U.S. law. While there are several technical ambiguities in EC
law, they do not expose manufacturers to unpredictible liability. The salient aspects of the EC scheme are its often rigorous
certification requirements and the potential liability for service
providers. While the latter may have little direct impact because of its apparent consistency with negligence principles,
the former may absolutely insulate manufacturers from liability. In addition, combining certification requirements and
strict service liability theories may allow manufacturers to reduce their liability exposure through successful third-party
suits against product endorsers.
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